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Résumé – Des événements récents ont montré qu’un terroriste déterminé était encore capable d’introduire à bord d’un avion de ligne 
des matières explosives pour tenter de le faire exploser en vol. Le risque d’attentat à l’explosif perpétré par un passager kamikaze dans 
la cabine d’un avion est bel et bien réel. Le projet SAMOSA s’inscrit dans ce contexte ; son objectif est de développer un système de 
détection basé sur des technologies d’imagerie Radiofréquence permettant la détection d’explosif embarqué par un passager du transport 
aérien, que cet explosif soit situé au contact du corps ou voire implanté de façon sous-cutanée dans le corps. Il nécessite de caractériser 
les propriétés diélectriques des explosifs constituant la menace la plus crédible. Cette nouvelle technologie présenterait de nombreux 
avantages par rapport à l’existant. Elle permettrait notamment de détecter des explosifs sur le corps humain sans dévoiler l’anatomie 
intime des passagers, principal frein aujourd’hui à l’acceptabilité des technologies en cours de déploiement. Ce projet propose de 
développer une nouvelle brique technologique qui pourra être utilisée sur le poste d'inspection filtrage du futur pour améliorer le niveau 
de réponse à cette menace. Ce projet s'inscrit dans la tendance actuelle des développements de technologies d'imagerie avancées. 
De plus, en abordant les aspects sociaux, éthiques et juridiques de ce type d’appareil, le projet apportera un éclairage nouveau sur la 
conception des outils de sécurité civile et leur intégration dans la société civile afin d’en améliorer son acceptabilité. 
Abstract – Recent events have shown that a determined terrorist could be able to board in a plane with explosive materials to blow up 
the plane during the flight. The risk that a kamikaze perpetrates a terrorist attack in the cabin of a plane is undeniably real. SAMOSA 
project falls within this context. Its objective is to develop a new detection system, based on microwave imaging technology, allowing 
the detection of embedded explosive on a flight passenger. The explosive could be carried closed to the body or subcutaneous. This new 
technology has many advantages compared to the existing one. It allows detecting explosives located on human body without revealing 
the intimate anatomy of passengers, this point being the main problem with the current deployed technology. The project suggests 
developing an advanced technology which could be used during the filtering and inspection boarding phases to improve the results 
related to this threat. In addition, the project is in the current tendency of developing advanced vision technology. However, addressing 
social ethic and juridical aspects of this kind of systems, the project will bring a new lighting about civil security tools and their 
integration in civil society. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 An exhaustive approach 
 
The objective of this innovative project is to develop a 
new detection system, based on microwave imaging 
technology, allowing the detection of embedded explosive 
on a flight passenger. 
The exhaustive approach is very interesting and 
innovative: in parallel of the technical activities, are 
studied the acceptability and interacceptability aspects, the 
legal, ethical, health and societal aspects. 
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1.2 Consortium 
Seven partners with various complementary 
competencies joined the consortium to allow this project 
presents an innovative and exhaustive approach of the 
activities (see Fig.1) 
 
 
FIG. 1 : SAMOSA consortium. 
 
• SATIMO is specialized in the design and development 
of antenna measurement, industrial control and 
tomographic imaging systems which are based on 
multi-sensors fast technologies to measure in quasi real 
time. SATIMO brings its expertise in RF systems 
development, production and integration. This project 
will bring a potential innovative product, a new market 
and a best knowledge of customer needs. 
 
• The team of the CEA which is concerned by the 
project is expert in the security, terrorist threats and 
explosives. Moreover, its powerful calculators are 
used during the project to make electromagnetic 
simulations of whole people. Results are used to 
develop imaging algorithms. 
 
• The concerned entity of the ONERA is specialized in 
radar signals, electromagnetic simulations, signal 
analysis, particularly in imaging algorithms. 
 
These two research centers bring to the project their 
scientific and technical knowledge and see in this 
project the opportunity to have new valorizations of 
their expertise on new markets. 
 
• The STAC (Service Technique de l’Aviation Civile) 
represents the end user of the innovative detection 
scanner for airport security. The STAC brings to the 
project its operational knowledge of airport 
environment. 
 
• The LAMIH-PERCOTEC laboratory is specialized in 
psychological and acceptability aspects of the use of 
the scanner for the passenger and for the operator. The 
LAMIH-ASHM laboratory is specialized in the multi-
criterion interacceptability aspects. 
 
• The “Groupe de Recherche sur la Sécurité et la 
Gouvernance” (GRSG) brings its expertise for the 
legal, ethical, health and societal aspects.  
 
These two research laboratories bring to the project 
their experience in the acceptability analysis as well as 
in the legal, ethical and health aspects. Through this 
project, they will work on new research domains and 
new valorization of their knowledge. 
 
• ANR (Agence Nationale de la Recherche) is financing 
the project and gives the objectives and coordination 
tools. The project is presenting an improvement of the 
security at the airports and participates to the synergy 
between the French actors. 
 
1.3 Organization and progress of the 
project 
 
This project is financed by the ANR within the CSOSG 
2010 program. Its initial duration is of 36 months as from 
March, 2011, but it has been extended of one year. The 
kick-off meeting took place on April 11th, 2011. The end of 
the project will take place on February 28th, 2015. The 
project is divided into 8 main tasks. Technical meetings 
take place regularly between the actors of the concerned 
tasks (see the Fig. 2). The project is punctuated by the 
biannual meetings and by associated deliverables. 
FIG. 2 : Main phases of the project. 
Previously, the context of the project and the main 
objectives had been presented [1], then the definition of the 
global specifications, the preliminary configuration and the 
feasibility study [2], and finally the acceptability of security 
scanners in French airports [3]. 
This first part of the paper is focused on the main results 
of the latest studies for legal, ethical and health aspects, as 
well as for the psychological aspects with the doctrine for 
the employment of disciplines. The second part is 
presenting the technical developments. 
 
2. Legal, ethical, health and 
psychology aspects as regards the use 
of security scanners. 
 
2.1 A huge piece of European legislation 
Although since 2001 a lot of measures supplementing 
the previous security standards have been added, the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation didn’t rule on 
security scanners and let each country choose its own 
regulation. In the United States, it is the TSA Transport 
Security Administration that rules on this issue. In the 
European Union, successive regulations were introduced: 
Regulation (EU n° 2320/2002) in 2002, replaced in 2008 
by Regulation (EU) n°300/2008 and completed in April 
2009 by Regulation (EU) n° 272/2009. The Commission 
Regulation (EU) n°185/2010 modified the text on March 
2010. Regulation (EU) n°1147/2011 of 11 November 2011 
is the last version; it implements the common basic 
standards as regards the use of security scanners at EU 
airports. 
Security scanners shall also be deployed and used in 
compliance with national and European regulations on the 
minimum health and safety requirements regarding the 
exposure of the public and workers to electromagnetic 
fields. Concerning the exposure of the general public there 
is the Council Recommendation 1999/519/EC of 12 July 
1999. This text is transposed in French law to the 
application decree n°2002-775 of 3 May 2002. For the 
exposure of workers, the European Parliament and the 
Council of 29 April 2004 took a first directive: 
2004/40/EC, but the transposition has been delayed by 
stakeholders, in particular those from the medical 
community. Finally it was repealed and replaced by 
Directive 2013/35/EU of 26 June 2013. Member States 
shall bring into force the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this 
Directive by 1 June 2016. French ANSES already 
published a “recommendation” for security scanners. 
 
2.2 A protocol in accordance with 
legislation for SAMOSA 
The number and the variety of these regulations need to 
be scrutinized as to their real force and at the eventual 
interference in case of confrontation. European legislation 
is compulsory and the common bases are minimum 
requirements. Each Member State is allowed to legislate 
beyond those minimum requirements. The analysis of the 
European and national legislation allows to establish a six 
points protocol for SAMOSA including image rights, 
respect for human dignity and for private and family life. 
These points are: a separate human reviewer; the use of an 
avatar; no storage nor copy of the data and images; 
previous information of the passenger; possibility to choose 
the gender of the reviewer; possibility to opt out the 
security scanner control and choose an alternative 
screening method including at least a hand search. 
In France, the matter of human dignity needs further 
specific developments. The hypertrophy of the topic in 
French law introduces multiple confusions between human 
rights and individual liberties. The protocol established for 
SAMOSA protects the public from any invasion of privacy 
not excluding however different individual feelings. Such 
feelings could be a problem and that should be prevented. 
 
2.3 Health problems 
The European legislation covers all known direct 
biophysical effects and indirect effects caused by 
electromagnetic fields but there are still a lot of no well-
established risks. The minimum health requirements 
regarding the exposure to electromagnetic fields changed 
since the 2000s. The thermal effects were the most 
important effects taken into account. Now various effects 
are mentioned as transient symptoms, such as vertigo or 
phosphenes, or the interference with medical electronic 
equipment and device. The effects on young children and 
long-term effects are not yet covered but are studied. Even 
electrosensitivity problems begin to be taken into account 
by the scientific community. The precautionary principle 
must be revised. 
 
2.4 Area of research 
In terms of ethic, politics and sociology: semi-structured 
interviews are under process to determinate more 
accurately the real feelings concerning airport security 
measures and more precisely security scanners. The role of 
the State, the respect for freedoms and human dignity, the 
possible invasion of privacy, the matter of health and the 
importance of information are examined.  
In terms of health: additional approaches are planned. 
The research laboratory XLIM from Limoges University 
will calculate by numerical simulation the penetration of 
human tissue by electromagnetic waves. Another approach, 
this time on the cellular level, will be asked to the 
cytogeneticist Catherine Yardin who worked on aneuploidy 
for cells exposed to electromagnetic fields. An interview of 
the “Collectif des Electrosensibles de France » is planned 
concerning the electrosensitivity. 
 
2.5 Psychology aspects  
A survey on the acceptability of security scanners was 
conducted in France in July 2012 with a sample of 458 air 
travelers. The majority of the respondents trusted security 
scanners to detect hidden explosives and would consent to 
undergo scanning if such scanners were implemented at 
French airports. The results also show a possible gap 
between public and experts. Indeed, the great majority of 
the respondents perceived breaches of neither their private 
life nor their freedoms or human dignity. The single 
significant difference regarding the respondent profile was 
that the women tended to be more sensitive to the breach of 
private life than the men were. Moreover, a great majority 
of the respondents disagreed with the statement that the 
visualization by a security officer of an image of their body 
would be embarrassing; nevertheless, it must be 
emphasized that perceived embarrassment occurred less 
frequently with an avatar than with an image of the body of 
the passenger. On the other hand, a majority of respondents 
(64.8 percent) disagreed with the statement that passing 
through a security scanner would have an effect on their 
health, whereas 27.4 percent agreed and 7.8 percent had no 
opinion. To conclude, the survey has showed a possible 
compliance of the public to social norms regarding security 
technologies: a very strong majority of the respondents 
(91.6 %) agreed with the statement that passing through a 
security scanner was normal in the fight against insecurity. 
 
3. Doctrine for the Employment of 
Disciplines 
 
In establishing a Client-Analyst relationship, the 
concepts of decision aiding [4] facilitates appropriate and 
timely investigations and productions of recommendations 
in a given reality. The Decision Aiding Process (DAP) 
approach [5] tackles decision aiding as a decisional process 
in four phases [6]: Problem Situation, Problem 
Formulation, Evaluation Model and Final 
Recommendation. 
In superposing DAP onto a checkpoint process for the 
four phases (Welcoming passengers, Preparation, 
Searching and Filtering), the SAMOSA project is better 
able to take into consideration human factors to improve 
the possibilities of a checkpoint. This enables a better 
preparation of how to integrate equipment. 
In this light, the different studies of human factors and 
their integration in the technical design process of the 
equipment (tasks t2 to t6) are linked up in a « Doctrine for 
the Employment of Disciplines » (task t7.2), based on the 
principals of the Theory of social choice [7], in order to 
improve the efficiency and combination of different 
domains. Prior to the design of the equipment, the domains 
of cognitive psychology (task t7.1) and the legal and 
political sciences (task t8) have been studying the issue of 
safety acceptability concerning passengers as well as the 
issues of ethics and dignity from a societal point of view. 
To extend the design activities, the management of the 
project (task t0) was enriched by several concepts taken 
from the management sciences, notably quality 
management, social responsibility, marketing and business 
development. To develop the equipment in a minimal 
amount of time, the Information and Communication 
Sciences highlighted the informational elements to be 
communicated to different stakeholders via the concept of 
decisional sensemaking. To operationalize the 
recommendations taken from the different disciplines, two 
Client-Analyst relationships are being defined to clarify the 
questions examined in the Project: 
- What is a more « permanently » stabilised definition of 
the needs of the checkpoint (task t1) from the point of view 
of the Civil Aviation Authoring as the final user? 
- What is a more precise definition of scenarios 
concerning target realities in order to improve the design 
robustness by the project leader, SATIMO? 
 
FIG. 3: Doctrine for the Employment of Disciplines. 
 
4. Technical aspects 
4.1 Preliminary prototype and first results 
 
To solve the first technical difficulties and show the 
feasibility of the system, a preliminary prototype has been 
made. A mechanical system equipped with two horns 
allows scanning a mannequin carrying some targets. The 
first horn is used in emission and the second one in 
reception. The two horns can be moved vertically and the 
human model can be rotated to allow a 3D scanning (see 
Fig. 4). First imaging tests are performed on a plastic 
mannequin filled with water and focused on the 0.8-12 
GHz frequency range. 
 
FIG. 4: Preliminary prototype. 
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A first type of imaging algorithm is used to analyze the 
experiments. The Fig.5 shows the principle of this 
algorithm. 
FIG. 5: Imaging algorithm. 
 
A lot of configurations have been tested. The mannequin 
is scanned with and without carrying target. The targets are 
different in shape and material. They are representative and 
simulate guns or explosives.  
From the numerous tests led, we can see that some 
targets are easier to detect, even without subtracting the 
background, than others. This is the case if the target is 
located on the side of the mannequin : the image resulting 
from the imaging algorithm, without subtracting the 
background, allows detecting it. For example, the Fig.6 
shows the results when the target is a metallic gun located 
on the side of the mannequin. The photography presents 
the test configuration; the first image is obtained for the 
mannequin alone; the second image is obtained for the 
mannequin carrying the gun. The target appears on the 
image. 
Some targets are more difficult to detect, in particular 
when the target is located against the trunk of the 
mannequin. In this case, the imaging algorithm is not 
capable to highlight the target without subtracting the 
background. It can be explained by the fact that the 
coupling of the mannequin and the target is more important 
in this case than when the target is located on the side of 
the mannequin. The Fig.7 shows the case of a metallic ball 
located on the trunk of the mannequin. The photography 
shows the test configuration; the first image is obtained for 
the mannequin alone; the second one for the mannequin 
with the metallic ball; the third image is obtained after 
subtracting the signal of the mannequin alone from the 
signal of the mannequin with the ball. This subtraction 
allows highlighting the target. 
Of course, in a realistic configuration, it won’t be 
possible to scan a person without an eventual target 
(background) and then to subtract it from the next 
acquisitions. But the feasibility of the detection has been 
demonstrated and more complex algorithms which do not 
require the subtraction of the background have now to be 
investigated. 
 
 
FIG. 6: Analysis example with a metallic gun as a target 
located on the side of the mannequin. 
 
FIG. 7: Analysis example with a metallic ball as the target 
located against the trunk of the mannequin. 
 
4.2 Imaging aspects 
 
For the RF portal system (frequency below 20 GHz) 
developed in SAMOSA project, the detection of concealed 
weapons (handguns, knives, explosives) that can be worn 
by airline passengers is based on the use of images derived 
from a three-dimensional cylindrical imaging technique. 
The selected 3D cylinder configuration of the portal turns 
out to be well suited to the morphology of the human body. 
In addition, it allows acquiring a multi-view information of 
the screening person without requiring it to turn on itself as 
is the case with a planar configuration system. Compared 
with millimeter wave systems, cross-range sampling being 
less severe in RF frequency band, the data size to process is 
less important which allows releasing the constraint on the 
required computing power. In addition, the use of larger 
wavelengths produce "scattering centers" images that do 
not have the "almost photographic" appearance of images 
obtained with millimeter system which poses problems in 
terms of privacy. 
 
The construction of the images is based on the inversion 
of the relation that connects the complex signal (amplitude, 
phase) returned by the object under test in near field E(f, θ, 
h) and its reflectivity σ(x,y,z) : 
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Re+Rr is the distance between each reflectivity element 
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cfk pi2=  is the wavenumber associated with the 
electromagnetic field illuminating the object under test. 
To avoid aliasing effects on the image, the scattering 
field by the object must be digitized with a sampling 
increment in frequency, angle and height which must 
satisfy the Shannon criterion: 
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c is the speed of light, Rs  and Hs are the radius and the 
height of the measurement portal, rp and hp are the radius 
and the height of the cylinder which include the body of the 
person. 
Among the multitude of techniques that can be used to 
calculate the images, back projection method like the 
Direct-And-Sum algorithm offers a flexible usage and 
allows taking into account the near-field configuration 
effects (spherical illumination, attenuation in distance of 
the EM field). In addition, it can be easily associated with 
recombinant signals techniques and post-processing (cross-
correlation, coherence factor) to improve the clarity of the 
images (notably the sidelobes level). Finally, in a real-time 
operating environment, this algorithm is naturally 
parallelizable. Before presenting some preliminary results, 
it is useful to recall that the response of most of the objects 
to detect (of less than 15 cm length) is in the resonant 
region when illuminated by RF signals. In this region 
characterized by a ratio between the size of the target and 
the wavelength of the EM signal comprised between 1 and 
10, the main scattering mechanisms are surface wave 
(traveling wave, creeping wave) and optical interactions 
(specular reflection, diffraction). The geometric details of 
targets don't affect significantly their response. 
During this year, imaging tests were performed on a 
hollow plastic mannequin (Fig. 8) filled with water and 
focused on the 0.8-12 GHz frequency range. The 
cylindrical configuration was performed with a turntable 
and a vertical rail (Fig. 4) on which a receiving and a 
transmitting antenna are placed. It is worth noting that the 
distance between the center of the turntable and the 
antennas is 70 cm and that the vertical scan of the antennas 
is 80 cm. In this frequency band, the image of the signal 
reflected by the mannequin consists of strong localized 
scatterers and do not clearly reveal its silhouette. For 
example, Fig. 9 shows a 3D mannequin image compressed 
to a 2D image using a maximum value projection obtained 
in VV polarization from a 112° angular domain centered 
around the front view and a frequency band between 0.8 
GHz and 12 GHz. 
 
 
FIG. 8: Mannequin alone. 
 
FIG.9: Mannequin image at 
0.8-12GHz (maximum value 
projection). 
 
Generally, and for most metallic or dielectric objects 
placed on the mannequin, the resulting image does not 
allow formal detection of their presence. However, if prior 
to the calculation of the image, the response of the 
mannequin is estimated using a sliding average angular 
method from the available measurements and is subtracted, 
detection becomes possible for a number of objects. 
Figure 11 shows the image of the response of the 
mannequin with two handguns (one plastic and one metal) 
(Fig. 10) illuminated with a RF signal between 2.7 GHz 
and 4.7 GHz in VV polarization. On the image, the two 
main echoes are localized at the same place as the 
handguns. Similarly, Figure 13 shows the result in the case 
of 2 low permittivity simulants of explosives of spherical 
(D = 50.8 mm) and cylindrical (D = H = 50.8 mm) shape 
placed on the mannequin (Fig. 12). The frequency band of 
the transmitted signal is between 8 GHz and 12 GHz. 
Again, we can see that the position of the 2 echoes coincide 
with the location of the explosives. 
 
 
FIG. 10: Mannequin with 2 
handguns.  
 
FIG.  11: Image obtained 
after removal of the response 
of the mannequin estimated 
by a sliding average angular 
method. 
 
FIG.  12: Mannequin with 
2 low permittivity 
explosives simulants. 
 
FIG.  13: Image obtained 
after removing the reflectivity 
of the mannequin by a sliding 
average angular method. 
 
The activities carried out during this year were used to 
assess the interest to operate the lower part of the RF band. 
It turns out that in this band, the contrast between the 
targets and the body is not favorable to direct detection. In 
particular, the lowest band between 800 MHz and 2 GHz 
whose implementation is tricky (dimensions of the 
antennas, coupling, etc.) is not determinative. For higher 
frequencies, the implementation of a body's response 
elimination technique has allowed to obtain interesting 
results for certain types of targets. 
 
In future work, the effectiveness of the body removal 
technique will be tested. We will also exploit higher 
frequencies (Ku-band) for which better direct detection is 
expected with a higher contrast between the response of the 
target and the body and also the presence of discriminating 
interactions (Fig. 14, Fig. 15). Finally, the coming year will 
also be the opportunity to exploit measurements on people 
obtained with the portal under development. 
 
 
FIG.  14 : Dielectric sphere 
(εr=2.53, D=50.8mm) 
 
FIG.  15: Down range 
response (ku band, VV) 
 
4.3 Technical developments 
 
In parallel of the tests with the preliminary prototype 
and of the work on the imaging aspects, some technical 
activities are led in order to develop the subsystems that 
will complete the future demonstrator. 
 
The first subsystem concerns the RF chains for emission 
and reception. The main difficulty will be to perform a very 
fast measurement. The FMCW technology has been 
chosen. The entire frequency band is divided in few narrow 
bands. A local oscillator YIG associated with multipliers 
allows generating the emitted signal. The reception RF 
chain is based on IQ mixers and a numerical receiver. 
The second subsystem concerns the antennas arrays. The 
imaging algorithm criterion imposes to place an antenna 
every 2 centimeters. The main difficulties are then, to 
reduce the size of the antennas and to decrease the coupling 
between them. Some electromagnetic simulations and 
measurement campaigns on prototypes have been 
performed to develop the new innovative antenna arrays. 
 
The following steps will be to integrate the subsystems 
together in order to build the demonstrator. This 
demonstrator will allow scanning in 3D a person carrying a 
potential target. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study project presents an innovative and exhaustive 
approach for developing an airport radiofrequency scanner. 
The acceptability and interacceptability aspects, the 
legal, ethical, health and societal aspects are studied in 
parallel of the technical developments. 
The project presents important technical challenges. 
Technical developments are being led and will end in 
innovative solutions. A functional demonstrator will allow 
validating the technical solution on real persons. 
 
This project is financed by the ANR in the frame of the 
CSOSG 2010 program. It has begun in March, 2011. The 
end of the project will take place on February 28th, 2015. 
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